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To control  their  deficits,  Brazil,  Mexico,  and  Pakistan  should  try
to raise revenues and curtail spending simultaneously. In
Argentina  and  Chile,  the first  priority  should  be to control  public
spending.
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Baffes and Shah use the cointegration approach  revenues and spending to control the deficit and
to determine whether deficits are more effec-  that spending and taxes tend to feed each other in
tively controlled by raising taxes or controlling  those countries.
expenditures - or both. They use long-term
historical time series data for Argentina, Brazil,  In Argentina and Chile, they found the
Chile, Mexico, and Pakistan.  deficit to be explosive - and caused by spend-
ing.  There was no empirical evidence of efforts
Many studies have examined causality in the  to adjust revenues to control the deficit.
relationships between taxes and spending in
developed countries.  Some have found evidence  They recommend that to control the deficit
that higher spending tends to lead to higher  Brazil, Mexico, and Pakistan should try to raise
taxes.  Some have found that higher taxes lead to  revenues and curtail spending simultaneously.
more spending.  Some find that causality runs  In Argentina and Chile, however, the first
both ways.  priority should be to control spending.
Baffes and Shah find that Brazil, Mexico,
and Pakistan have continuously tried to align
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I.  Introduction
Government  deficits  especially  in  developing  countries  are rising  at an
alarming  pace.  Further,  it is  believed  that  chronic  deficits  often  discourage
economic  growth,  and  adversely  affect  other  macroeconomic  aggregates.
Controlling  deficits  involves  raising  taxes,  or reducing  expenditures.
Raising  taxes  has  adverse  effects  on the  private  sector  and  on economic  growth
in  general. Reducing  expenditures  is  also  a difficult  task  because  It
involves  long-run  commitments.  Further,  if  public  spending  is  primarily
devoted  to  development  of basic  Infrastructure,  as in  many  developing
countries,  then  avenues  for  reducing  spending  might  be  quite limited  (see
Shah,  1990). In  either  case  however,  the  problem  Is  that  raising  taxes  may
induce  higher  spending  or reducing  spending  may induce  lower  taxes,  without
necessarily  affecting  the  deficit. The latter  result  obtains  if  expenditure
reduction  results  in  unacceptably  low  standards  of public  services  and
thereby  unleash  strong  anti-public  sector  sentiment  creating  political
pressures  to lower  taxes. This  paper  focuses  on qualitative  and  quantitative
effects  of spending  on revenues  and  vice-versa  for  five  developing  countries.
While  many  studies  have  examined  relationships  between  taxes  and  spending
In  developed  countries  from  a causality  point  of view,  no common  agreement
exists  as to the  direction  of the  causality. For  example,  Anderson,  Wallace
and  Warner  (1986)  and  Von  Furstenberg,  Green,  and  Jeong  (1985)  have  found
evidence  that  higher  spending  tends  to lead  taxes. Manage  and  Marlow  (1986)
and  Ahiakpor  and  Amirkhalkhali  (1989),  on the  other  hand,  have  found  that
causality  runs  the  opposite  direction. In  a more  recent  study,  Miller  and
Russek  (1990)  found  bidirectional  causality  between  expendltures  and  revenues
for  the  U.S. (their  study  Included  federal,  state,  and local  level  data).-
1The  most Important  element  which  differentiates  the  present  study  from
previous  ones is that  it  carries  out  a formal  test  of  whether  governments  make
consistent  attempts  to  align  revenues  with  spending. In  doing  so  we are  also
able  to  r.ake  inferences  as to  whether  non-tax  revenues  play  an important  role
in  determining  the  level  of the  deficit. 2 Further,  this  Is the  first  study  of
its  kind  for  developing  nations.
The  specific  objectives  of this  study  are:  (a)  to test  whether  a long-
run  relationship  between  revenues  and  expenditures  exists;  (b)  If such  a
relationship  exists,  what is the  direction  of the  causality;  and (c)  quantify
those  causality  effects  by estimating  the  error  correction  representation  and
subsequently  calculating  variance  decompositions  and  impulse  responses. The
paper  is  structured  in the  following  manner. The  next  section  discusses  the
theoretical  model  and  the  concepts  which  are  required  for the  development  of
the  test.  Section  III  describes  the  data,  the  estimation  procedure,  and the
empirical  results. The last  section  presents  conclusions  along  with  some
policy  implications  and  directions  for future  research.
II.  Theoretical  Considerations
Consider  a  government  whose  objective  Is to  maximize  welfare  by choosing  the
level  of public  goods  and services  to  be consumed. The  instantaneous  indirect
welfare  function,  V(p,E),  is  defined  as:
(1)  V(p,E)  a  Max (W(z):  px =  E),
x
where  x denotes  che  vector  of goods  and  services,  p represents  the  exogenously
determined  price  vector,  and  E denotes  expenditures.  W(x) Is  a twice
continuously  differentiable  concave  welfare  function. In  order  to finance
expenditures  the  government  uses  revenues,  denoted  as  T.  In  general  it  would
be expected  that  T =  E so that  the  government  solely  covers  expenditures
2through  taxation. In  most  cases  however  the  governments  do not  operate  on a
balanced  budget  schedule  so that  T *  E, and  hence,
(2)  Dt = T  - Er.
The natural  question  arising  at this  moment  Is  whether  Dt represents  short-run
deviations  from  zero  or  whether  It  consistently  deviates  from  zero  even in the
long  run.3
An intuitive  way to  test  whether  revenues  and  expenditures  drift  apert
In the  short  run  only,  would  be to form the  regression
(3)  Tt  =  90 +  gIEt  +Ct
where  10  and 3  denote  parameters  to be estimated. Then test  Ho  $0  =  C'  and
1li  =  1  against  HI:  o0  *  O and  P I  1,  where  acceptance  of Ho  would Imply  that
the  government  has  been  making  consistent  attempts  to  equate  revenues  to
spending,  at least  in the  long  run.  Notice  that  if  H  Is true,  (3)  collapses
to (2)  where  t  =  Dt,  which  means  that  the  government  finances  expenditures
entirely  through  revenues.
This test  however  presents  some  shortcomings.  First,  the  test  is very
restrictive  in the  sense  that  it Is rather  unlikely  for  the  governments  to run
balanced  budgets  on an annual  basis,  so  H  Is likely  to be rejected. Second,
this  procedure  fails  to take  into  consideration  certain  properties  of time
series  variables  which  sometimes  may  Invalidate  standard  regression  results,
namely  that  the  variables  being  considered  are  stationary.  To circumvent
those  shortcomings  we take  the  alternatlive  of testing  wnether  Tt and  Et are
cointegrated.  Notice  that  cointegration  not  only  takes  Into  account
stationarity  properties  of the  variables  being  considered,  but also It
examines  whether  T  and  Et move  together  in the  long  run,  allowing  for  short-
run  deviations. 4
Cointegration  requires  that  all  variables  are  of the  same  order  of
3integra.lon.  Let  ;  first  give  an intuitive-explanation  of the  concept  of the
order  of Integration. If  a series  has  a finite  mean  and  variance  It is  called
integrated  of order  zero,  and is  denoted  as I(O).  If the  series  needs  to  be
differenced  once to  become  I(O),  it is  then  called  integrated  of order  one,
I(1). In  general  a series  that  is  required  to  be differenced  d times  to
become  I(O)  is  called  I(d).  If two  series  are  I(d)  and  there  exists  a linear
combination  of those  series  which  is I(b)  with  b <  d,  then  the  series  are  to
be cointegrated,  denoted  as CI(d,d-b). For  practical  purposes  we generally
consider  I(1)  series  since  most  economic  variables  become  I(O)  after  being
differenced  once and  hence  the  cointegrated  system  is  CI(1,1). Ir  what
follows,  the  terms  stationarity  (or  stationarity  in  levels)  and I(O)  will be
used interchangeably.
First,  the  order  of integration  of the  variables  under  consideration  must
be  determined. Three  prominent  procedures  to  determinr  tile  order  of
Integration  are:  (a)  Dickey-Fuller  (DF),  (b)  augmented  Dickey-Fuller  (ADF),
and (c)  Durbin-Watson  (DW). The'DF  test  is  based  on the  regression: AXt  =  A
+  1lXt + et,  where  Xt  denotes  the  variable  of interest  and  a  denotes  the
difference  operator;  p  and  $  denote  parameters  to  be estimated. The  null
hypothesis  (H  )  is:  X  is not I(O). Ho is  rejected  if  the  estimate  of t3  is
negative  and  significantly  different  from  zero. The  ADF test  is  based  on:
AXt  =i+  3X  + E  r  7 AX  +  c  , where  xr  is  selected  so that  e  is  white
t-I  1=1  I  tI  t  .
noise;  I, $, and  V  denote  parameters  to be estimated  as before. Again  Ho is
rejected  if  $  is  negative  and  significantly  different  from  zero.  Finally,  the
DW test  is  based  on the  Durbin-Watson  statistic  of:  Xt  =  I  +  £t.  Low  DW
t.  ~~t
statistic  indicates  that  X  is  not I(O).
t
If the  variables  of interest  are  all  say I(1),  to test  for  cointegration
we regress  one  variable  on the  other  and then  test  whether  the  estimated
residual  is I(O).  In  other  words  we estimate  (3)  and  then  test  for
4stationarity  of ce.  Notice  that  since  one  of the  primary  objectives  of this
study  Is  to test  whether  the  government  m.kses  consistent  attempts  to  equate
revenues  with  spending,  we first  test  for  stationarity  of Dt  which  implicitly
imposes  the  balanced  budget  constraint  as a long-run  restriction.5  Therefore,
testing  for  coir.tegration  between  Et  and  Tt  assuming  that  a long-run
relationship  between  revenues  and  spending  exists,  becomes  a simple  unit  root
test In  the  univariate  process  (Engle  and  Yoo, 1987). In  the  case  that  Dt is
not I(O)  we proceed  to  estimate  (3). Notice  that  since  the  cointegration
parameter  is  unique  in the  bivariate  case,  if  we find  cointegration  by
restricting  10 =  0 and $  =  1 then  the  regression  in (3)  should  produce  tl.e
same  outcome  . 6
As  a second  step  we test  to see  whether  there  exists  causality  between
expenditures  and  revenues  (Granger,  1969). Notice  that if  the lndividual
series  are I(1)  (which  Is  the  case  as it  will  be shown  in the  next  section)  we
have to take  differences  to induce  stationarity.  Hence,  we estimate  the
following  relationship:
i.  T
(4a)  AT  +  AEt =  +  E aIATt-I  + E $t  Et  i  + Ut.
~~~~~  t
(4b)  AE~t  +  ATt  v  + EIAEt  +  E  AT t  +  V,
where  1,  of,  a  .t,  v, al,  1l, I, and  S  denote  parameters  to  be estimated;  'r
denotes  the  number  of lags  which is  not  necessarily  tne  same  for  all
variables. ut  and  vt  are  assumed  to  be mutually  uncorrelated  white  noise
processes. If  $0  =  a  =  0 and  some  's and  8  's  have  non-zero  values,
(4a-4b)  implies  a simple  causal  relation  with  feedback  (i.e.  simple
bidirectional  causality). If  a0  0  O and  60  0  O and  some  Si's  and  6I's  have
non-zero  values,  then (4a-4b)  implies  instantaneous  bidirectional  causality.
Finally,  unidirectional  causality  is implied  if the  above  relations  hold  for
5one  equation  only.  In terms  of Tt  and  Et.  simple  causality  means  that  past
Et  only  affects  Tt,  while  instantaneous  causality  means  that  both  past  and
current  Et  affect  Tt  and  vice-versa.  Such  causal  relationships  can  be
detected  with  conventional  F-tests.
One  other  Important  element  we consider  in  this  study  Is  the  relation
between  cointegration  and  causality. If  the  variables  being  considered  are
cointegrat_d,  there  exists  causality  in  at least  one  direction  (Granger,
1986). Further,  an additional  implication  of cointegration  is that  if there
exists  cointegration  then  the  system  can  be represented  by an error  correction
mechanism  (ECM). 7 The implication  of such  representation  is that  we quantify
the  causality  effects  by constructing  the  Vector  Autoregressive  (VAR)
representation  of the  bivariate  system  as defined  by Tt  and  Et  and  also
incorporate  the long-run  relationship  as follows  (for  a complete
characterization  of VAR  processes  see  Sims (1980)):
T  T
(5a)  ATt  = v  0Dt_  +  E  (Xi  AT  +  1fE  +,t-  to
(5b)  AE  =  8 D  +  F XAT  +  E 8AE  +  V
where  Dt 1  is the  lagged  level  of deficit. The remaining  variables  and
parameters  are  defined  in (4a-4b). It Is interesting  to  notice  that if  we
replace  AEt  and  ATt  by Dt  In  the  causality  regressions  (4a-4b)  we arrive  at
the  ECM  representation;  so cointegration  unifies  ECM and  conventional.
causality  models.  (Sa-Sb)  is  sometimes  called  restricted  VAR,  where  the
restriction  is the  residual  from the  cointegration  regression  (in  this  case
the  observed  deficit  or the  error  term  of (3)). The advantage  of the  ECM  as
opposed  to the  unrestricted  VAR is  that  by including  the  deiicit  in the
equations  we retain  information  in levels,  without  distorting  the  stationarity
properties  of the  variables  involved  in  the  system,  since,  because  of
6cointegrati.on  Dt_ 1 Is I(0). From  the  estimated  VAR  system  we can  then
calculate  Impulse  responses  and  variance  decompositions  as  means  of
quantification  of the  causality  effects.
III. Data,  Estimation,  and  Results
Data  In the  current  study  Include  total  government  expenditures  and total
revenues  for  the  countrien  of Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile,  Mexico,  and  Pakistan.
The  data series  for  Argentina  cover  the  1904-1983  time  period  and  were
obtained  from  unpublished  World  Bank  Tables. Data  for  Brazil  cover  the
1905-1983  period  and  were  obtained  from  Estatisticas  Historicas  do Brasil.
Data  for  Mexico  cover  the  1895-1984  time  period  and  were  obtained  from
Estatisticas  Historicas  de Mexico. Data  for  Pakistan  cover  the  1947-1989
period  and  were  obtained  from  various  publications  of the  Central  Statistical
Office,  Government  of Pakistan. Finally,  data for  Chile  cover  the  1960-1985
time  period  and  were  obtained  from  Banco  Central  De Chile. Because  of some
missing  observations,  the  data  set  for  Argentina  and  Mexico  contain  71 and  78
observations  respectively.  All  series  were adjusted  by the  respective  GDP
deflators  in  view  of the  high inflation  rates  experienced  by the  Latin
Arerican  countle3  Included  in this  study. The .ATS  package  was  used  to
estimate  the  models.
The  remainder  of this  section,  which  is  divided  in  four  parts,  will
discuss  and  analyze  results  regarding  cointegration  (Table  1),  causality
(Table  2),  as well  as variance  decompositions  (Table  3) and impulse  responses
(Figures  1,  2, and  3).
(1)  Cointegration
The  first  step  regarding  cointegration  is the  determination  of the  order  of
integration  of revenues  and  spending. Table  1  reports  such  results. In  all
7cases  both revenues  and  spending  were  found  to  be nonstationary  and  hence  the
first  differences  had to  be considered.  Stationarity  tests  for  the  first
differences  Indicated  that  both  variables  In  all  countries  were I(1).
The second  step  was to  determine  the  order  of integration  of D  . For
Argentina  all three  tests  indicated  that  Dt is  nonstationary  (D% level  of
significance).  This  means  that  the  Argentinean  government  ha-  not  been  able
to  equate  revenues  and  spending  In  the  long  run.  The  next  step  was to test
for  cointegration  by considering  the  unrestricted  version  of the  cointegration
regression  (i.e.  relationship  (3)). All  three  tests  indicated  that  there
exists  strong  evidence  of cointegration. (The  cointegration  regression  - not
reported  here  - gave  a coefficient  of 0.65). To summa.ize,  cointegration
tests  for  Argentina  indicate  that  although  revenues  and spending  move  together
In  the  long  run  there  Is  an  unexplained  component  in  spending  since  revenues
account  for  65%  of spending  only.
Cointegration  tests  for  Brazil  showed  evidence  of cointegration. In
particular  the  DW and  ADF test  indicate  mild  evidence  of cointegration  while
the  DF test  Indicates  strong  evidence. In  what follows  we consider  that
revenues  and  spending  in  Brazil  are  cointegrated.
For  Chile,  all three  cointegration  tests  showed  that  revenues  and
spending  are  not cointegrated  (5%  level  of significance).  The conclusion  was
the  same  even  when relationship  (3)  was  estimated  (estimates  not  reported
here).  The implication  of such  result  is that  there  exist  a nonstationary
component  (such  as seigniorage  or  borrowing)  that  causes  explosiveness  of the
deficit  which is  not  being  taken  into  censideration.
For  Mexico,  the  results  are the  same  as in  Brazil. Notice  that  all  three
tests  supported  stationarity  of the  deficit  at the  1% level  of significance.
For  Pakistan  the  results  are  almost  Identical. The  only  differencc  is that
the  results  hold for  the  5% level  of significance.  Notice  that  the  ADF test
8for  Pakistan  indicates  that  Et  and  Tt are  I(2). However,  the  deficit  Is  still
I(O),  thus  supporting  cointegration.
(ii) Causality
Table  2 reports  causality  results. In  order  to conserve  space  we do not
report  parameter  estimates  and  other  statistics  of the  system. To facilitate
comparability  with  other  studies  we report  results  for  all three  types  of
causality  (i.e.  simple  causality,  instantaneous  causality,  and  causality  with
the cointegration restriction Imposed).
For  all three  countries  for  which  cointegration  was  found  instantaneous
causality  runs  both  directions  (i.e.  revenues  cause  spending  and  spending
causes  revenues). Notice  that  the  finding  of at least  one  direction  causality
is consistent  wlth the  existence  of cointegration  between  revenues  and
spending  foi those  three  countries. On the  other  hand,  while  simple  causality
runs  from  spending  to  revenues  for  Pakistan  no simple  causality  in  any
direc.tion  was  found  for  Brazil  and  Mexico. When the  colntegration  restriction
is imposed,  Mexico  exhibits  bidirectional  causality. In  Brazil,  revenues
cause  spending  while  the  opposite  is  true  for  Pakistan.
Since  cointegration  was  not  found  for  Argentina  and  Chile,  the
possibility  that  the  deficit  causes  (or  is  caused  by)  expenditures  and/or
revenues  was  examined. Thus,  we tested  all  possible  causal  relations  among  T,
E, and  D.  Specifically,  the  results  for  Argentina  show that  Instantaneous
causality  runs in  all  directions  (i.e.  among  deficit,  revenues,  and  spending).
On the  other  hand,  simple  causality  runs  from  spending  to  revenues  and  from
deficit  to revenues.
It is  of interest  to  notice  that  while  simple  causality  was  found  in  a
few  cases  only,  instantaneous  ca"isality  was  found  in  almost  any  case  examined.
The implication  of this  is that  decisions  to reduce/increase  spending  are
being  made  simultaneously  with  decisions  to Increase/reduce  revenues.
9Finally,  it  should  be  noticed  that  the  qualitative  nature  of the  causality
results  did  not change  wnen  other  lag  structures  were considered.  Single
exceptien  to this  constitutes  Pakistan,  in  which  case ihen  more than  two  lags
were  considered  no causality  was found  in  any  direction.
(iii)  Variance  Decompositions
Variance  decompositions  exhibit  the  contribution  of each  source  of innovation
to the  variance  of the  k-year  ahead  forecast  error  for  each  of the  variables.
Stated  otherwise,  variance  decompositions  refer  to a breakdown  of the  change
in the  value  of the  variable  in  a given  year  arising  from  changes  in the  same
variable  as well  as other  variables  in  previous  years. Table  3 gives
estimates  of variance  decompositions  for  Brazil,  Mexico,  and  Pakistan. As it
was mentioned  earlier,  for  Chile  and  Argentina  T and  E do not fully  describe
the  deficit  so  we did  not  form the  ECM  representation.  The  results  can  be
summarized  as follows. 95%  of the  variation  of expenditures  in  Mexico  is
accounted  by  past expenditures,  while  only  5% is  accounted  by past revenues.
This  pattern  seems  to  be consistent  through  the  whole  period  examined. The
same  picture  is  presented  when  we consider  revenues,  i.e.  96%  of the  variation
in  revenues  is accounted  by past  expenditures  while  4% only is  accounted  by
past  revenues.
In  Brazil,  changes  in  expenditures  account  for  most  of the  variation  in
future  expenditures  as in the  case  of  Mexico. On the  other  hand,  changes  in
revenues  and  expenditures  equally  account  for  the  variance  of revenues. Again
this  pattern  is  consistent  through  the  whole  period  examined.
In  Pakistan,  changes  in  expenditures  account  for  most  of the  variation  in
future  expenditures.  On the  other  hand,  changes  in  revenues  account  for  abcut
75%  of the  variation  in  future  revenues  throughout  the  period  examined. To
summarize,  it  appears  that  in  most  cases  expenditures  account  for  most  of the
variation  in  both  future  expenditures  and  future  revenues.
10(iv)  Impulse  Responses
Impulse  responses  give the  dynamic  response  of each  variable  to policy  changes
affecting  this  variable  as  well  as of the  ocher  variables  included  In the
system. In  other  words,  impulse  responses  describe  whether  a shock  of one
variable  has  a persistent  or transitory  effect  on the  other  variables  as well
as on the  variable  itself. Figure  1  depicts  impulse  responses  for  Brazil. In
general  all  four  impulse  responses  presert  similar  picture. A one-standard
deviation  shock  on spending  induces  more spending  as well  as more revenues  in
the  first  period  while  after  the  third  period  both  spending  and  revenues
return  to the  pre-shock  level. The same  picture  is  presented  when  we consider
the  own-effect  of revenues. On the  other  hand  revenue  shock  has  no effect  on
spending  in the  first  period,  while  after  a negative  effect  in the  second
period  spending  returns  to Its  pre-shock  level.
Figure  2 glves  impulse  responses  for  Mexico. The  effect  of a shock  of
spending  on both  spending  and  revenues  as  well  as the  effect  of revenue  shock
on revenues  are  similar: after  an increase  In the  first  period  the  variables
tend  to return  to the  pre-shock  levels  following  an oscillatory  process.
Revenue  shock  on spending  however  has no  effect  in the  first  period,  while
after  a  negative  effect  in the  second  period  it  oscillates  before  it returns
to its  pre-shock  level.
Figure  3  gives impulse  responses  for  Pakistan. Spending  shock  has the
same  effect  on  both revenues  and  spending. I.e.  there  is  a large  positive
effect  in  the  first  period. After  that,  the  variables  have  a tendency  to
return  to the  pre-shock  levels. To some  extent  spending  responds  the  same  way
to revenues  shock. Comparing  Pakistan  with  Brazil  and  Mexico  however  we
observe  that in the  Pakistani  case  the  shocks  tend  to  be persistent,  that is,
it  takes  longer  for the  variables  to return  to the  pre-shock  level. This
result  is  consistent  with  the  fact  that  for  Brazil  no simple  causality  but
11strong  instantaneous  causality  was found  while  both  types  of causality  were
found  for  Pakistan.
To summarize,  it  seems  that  both  Brazil  and  Mexico  present  the  same
picture  in the  sense  that  the  shocks  have short  run  effects  only.  On the
contrary,  in  Pakistan  the  shocks  have  persistent  effects.
IV.  Summary  and  Conclusions
In  this  paper  an attempt  was made  to:  (a)  determine  whether  governments  have
continuously  attempted  to align  revenues  or spending  to  control  the  deficit.
(This  was  done  by testing  whether  there  exists  cointegration  between  revenues
and  spending);  (b)  test  for  causality  between  taxes  and  spending;  and (c)
quantify  the  causality  effects  by (f)  estimating  an error  correction  model  and
(ii)  calcuiating  variance  decompositions  and  impulse  responses. The tests
were carried  out  for  the  countries  of  Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile,  Mexico,  and
Pakistan. The  availability  of long  data series  primarily  determined  the
selection  of those  countries.
The  results  can  be summarized  as follows: The  governments  of Brazil,
Mexico,  and  Pakistan  seem to  have  successfully  aligned  revenues  and  spending
as  means  of controlling  the  deficit  over the  time  period  examined  while  a
similar  deduction  for  Argentina  and  Chile  could  not  be made.  For  Brazil,
Mexico,  and  Pakistan  strong  instantaneous  causality  runs  both  directions. In
Argentina  and  Chile  deficit  was  found  to cause  and  be caused  by expenditures.
Impulse  responses  for  Mexico  and  Brazil  were  found  to  have  short-run  effects
only  while  for  Pakistan  the  effects  were  more  persistent. In terms  of
variance  decompositions  it  was found  that  variations  In  both revenues  and
spending  are  explained  in  most  part  by past spending. The  above  results
suggest  that  to control  the  deficit,  Brazil,  Mexico,  and  Pakistan  should
attempt  to raise  revenues  and  curtail  expenditures  simultaneously.  In
12Argentina  and Chile,  on the  other  hand,  controlling  public  expenditures  should
be the  first  priority.
An important  qualification  Is in  order  here.  The results  stated  earlier,
are  based  on long  term  relationships  that  may  differ  from  the  present
situation. A case in  point  is  Chile,  that  has succeeded  in eliminating  the
budget  deficit  since  the  end  of the  period  of observations  in  our  sample. In
contrast,  the  deficit  has increasedl  in  Argentina  and  Brazil  in  more  recent
years.
13ENDNOTES
Other  studies  Include  Furstenberg,  Green,  and  Jeong (1986);  Ram (1988a,
1988b);  Ahsan,  Kwan,  and  Sahni  (1989);  Holtz-Eakin,  Newey,  and  Rosen (1989);
Miller  and  Russek (1990). In  particular  Miller  and  Russek  tested  for
causality  by imposing  the  cointegration  restriction  as defined  in (3)  of this
study. The  present  study  makes  an explicit  distinction  between  the
cointegration  restriction  defined  in (2)  and  the  cointegration  restriction
defined  In (3).
2  An Important  element  of non-tax  revenue,  especially  in  Latin  America,  is
seigniorage  (i.e.  inflation  tax). See  Kiguel  and Neumeyer  (1989)  for  a
treatment  of seigniorage  in  Argentina.
3  To be precise,  the  government  is  constrained  to run  balanced  budget  In
present  value terms. So the  constraint  to  test  would  be,  7  o(1+8)  t  lT,  -
co  (1+8)  Et  =  0,  where a  denotes the discount rate.  We chose to test the
balanced  budget  constraint  associated  with (2)  because  It is  convenient  to
form  the  ECM  representation  and  subsequently  carry  out the  causality  tests.
See  Hamilton  and  Flavin  (1986)  for  a test  regarding  the  balanced  budget
restriction  In  present  value  terms.
4  Ihe  theory  of cointegration  Is  discussed  extensively  in  Engle  and  Granger
(1987),  Hendry (1986),  and  Granger  (1986).
5  Several  studies  have considered  theoretical  restrictions  In testing
cointegration.  For  example,  Campbell  and  Shiller  (1987)  tested  the  term
structure  of the interest  rate;  Corbae  and  Oullaris  (1988)  tested  the
Purchasing  Power  Parity. Other  studies  of similar  nature  include  Hall (1986)
and  Ambler  (1989).
146  It is true  that  the  cointegratlon  regression  gives  an  excellent  estimate  of
the  cointegratlon  parameter. However  this  Is the  case In large  samples  only.
In  small  samples  the  regression  does  not  guarantee  that  the  cointegration
parameter  will be found.
The  equivalence  between  cointegration  and  ECM  comes  directly  from  Granger
representation  theorem  (Engle  and  Granger,  p.  225).  The  ECM type  of models
were  first  Introduced  by Phillips  (1957).
15TABLE 1:  Stationarity Tests
DW  DF  ADF
ARGENTINA (71 observations)
Et  0.075  -0.396  -0.511
AE  1.939  -8.030  -5.786
Tt  0.105  -1.171  -0.946
AT  2.581  -11.429  -6.199
Dt  0.352  -1.975  -2.047
BRAZIL (78 observations)
Et  0.038  0.861  1.926
AEt  2.463  -11.179  -7.816
T  0.028  1.430  2.608 t
ATt  2.481  -11.165  -7.170
Dt  0.625  -3.621  -2.977
CHILE (26  observations)
Et  0.318  -1.292  *-1.362
AEt  1.979  -4.638  -3.224
T  0.114  -0.867  -1.008
ATt  1.402  -3.418  -3.196
D  t  0.636  -2.046  -2.470
MEXICO (78  observations)
E  t  0.053  0.381  0.206
AEt  1.856  -7.994  -4.889
Tt  0.089  -0.647  -0.388
ATt  2.262  -9.817  -3.174
Dt  0.963  -4.091  -8.289
continued
16PAKISTAN  (42  observations)
Et  0.024  4.018  3.442
AE  1.358  -4.420  -2.872
t
T  0.023  6.066  4.744
t
AT  1.047  -2.921  -1.027
t.
D  0.783  -3.081  -3.257
t.
NOTE:  Et and  Tt denote  spending  and  revenues;  Dt denotes  deficit;  A
represents the difference operator (i.e.  AEt  =  Et - Et t  and AT  =  T  - T  ).
The  critical  values  for  Argentina,  Brazil,  and  Mexico  are:  DW =  0.259 (5%)  and
0.376  (1%)  (from  Sargan  and  Bhargava  (1983),  Table  1);  DF and  ADF  =  -2.89  (5%)
and  -3.59  (1%)  (from  Fuller  (1976),  TA  statistic,  Table  8.5.2).
The  critical  vOlues  for  Pakistan  are:  DW =  0.493  (5%)  and  0.705 (1%)
(from  Sargan  and  Bhargava  (1983),  Table  1);  DF and  ADF  =  -2.93  (5%)  and  -3.58
(1%)  (from  Fuller  (1976),  T  statistic,  Table  8.5.2).
The  critical  values  for  Chile  are: DW = 0.770 (5%)  and 1.081  (1%)  (from
Sargan  and  Bhargava  (1983),  Table  1);  DF and  ADF  =  -3.00  (5%)  and  -3.75 (1%)
(from  Fuller  (1976),  TA  statistic,  Table  8.5.2.). These  statistics  are  based
on Monte  Carlo  experiments  made  on 100,  50,  and 25  observations,  respectively.
The  number  of lags  in the  ADF test  was  determined  by the  Akaike
information  criterion.
17TABLE  2:  Causality  Tests
ARGENTINA  CHILE
I  II  I  II
T does  not  cause  E  0.07  6.83  0.18  0.46
E does  not cause  T  6.47  10.64  0.05  0.39
T  does  not cause  D  0.10  28.68  0.91  1.27
D  does  not cause  T  6.47  34.58  0.05  0.83
D  does not  cause  E  0.07  5.49  0.18  40.02
*  *
E does  not  cause  D  0.10  5.51  0.91  41.74
BRAZIL
I  II  III
T  does  not  cause  E  0.08  32.67  4.54
E does  not  cause  T  0.06  32.65  0.28
MEXICO
I  II  III
T does  not  cause  E  0.01  660.41  13.65
E does  not  cause  T  0.15  661.78  6.30
PAKIST.'
I  II  III
T does  not  cause  E  2.65  4.05  2.34
E does  not cause  T  3.25  4.38  3.52
NOTE:  I  means  simple  causality,  II  means  instantaneous  causality,  while III
means  causality  with the  cointegration  restriction  imposed. One  star (*)
Indicates  rejection  of  no causality  at the  5% level  of signlflcance  while  two
stars  (**)  Indicate  rejection  of  no causality  at the  1% level. All tests  were
carried  out  with one  lag.
18TABLE 3:  Proportion  of  Forecast  Error  Variance  K Periods  Ahead  Produced  by
Each  Innovation.
Ixinovation  In:
MEXICO  BRAZIL  PAKISTAN
Error
in  K  E  T  E  T  E  T
E  1  1.000  .000  1.000  .000  1.000  .000
2  .946  .054  .966  034  .955  .045
3  .952  .048  .961  .039  .939  .061
4  .949  .051  .961  .039  .935  .065
5  .950  .050  .961  .039  .934  .066
6  .950  .050  .961  .039  .933  .067
7  .950  .050  .961  .039  .933  .067
8  .950  .050  .961  .039  .933  .067
9  .950  .050  .961  .039  .933  .067
10  .950  .050  .961  .039  .933  .067
T  1  .966  .U34  .496  .504  .207  .793
2  .954  .046  .494  .506  .250  .750
3  .954  .046  .494  .506  .262  .738
4  .953  .047  .494  .506  .265  .735
5  .952  .048  .494  .506  .266  .734
6  .952  .048  .494  .506  .267  .733
7  .952  .048  .494  .506  .268  .732
8  .952  .048  .494  .506  .267  .733
9  .952  .048  .494  .506  .267  .733
10  .952  .048  .494  .506  .267  .733
NOTE:  K  indicates years.  E and T denote spending and revenues respectively.
One lag  was used to estimate the ECM model.  No major differences in the
results were observed when other lag lengths  were considered.
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